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5th ACM-EC 2004: New York, NY, USA
- Jack S. Breese, Joan Feigenbaum, Margo I. Seltzer:
Proceedings 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2004), New York, NY, USA, May 17-20, 2004. ACM 2004, ISBN 1-58113-771-0
Session 1
- Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, Pierfrancesco La Mura
:
Negotiation-range mechanisms: exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets. 1-8 - Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan
, Elan Pavlov:
Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market. 9-20 - Alessandro Acquisti:
Privacy in electronic commerce and the economics of immediate gratification. 21-29
Session 2
- Joshua T. Goodman, Robert Rounthwaite:
Stopping outgoing spam. 30-39 - Thede Loder, Marshall W. van Alstyne
, Rick Wash
:
An economic answer to unsolicited communication. 40-50 - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. 51-60
Session 3
- Ryan Porter:
Mechanism design for online real-time scheduling. 61-70 - Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes:
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions. 71-80 - Satinder Singh, Vishal Soni, Michael P. Wellman:
Computing approximate bayes-nash equilibria in tree-games of incomplete information. 81-90
Session 4
- Sergio Marti, Hector Garcia-Molina:
Limited reputation sharing in P2P systems. 91-101 - Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Ion Stoica, John Chuang:
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks. 102-111 - Baruch Awerbuch, Boaz Patt-Shamir, David Peleg, Mark R. Tuttle:
Collaboration of untrusting peers with changing interests. 112-119
Session 5
- Aranyak Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Randomized truthful auctions of digital goods are randomizations over truthful auctions. 120-124 - Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Elchanan Mossel, Amin Saberi:
On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods. 125-131 - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. 132-141
Session 6
- WooYoung Kim, Alan H. Karp:
Customizable description and dynamic discovery for web services. 142-151 - Michael Benisch, Amy Greenwald
, Victor Naroditskiy, Michael Carl Tschantz:
A stochastic programming approach to scheduling in TAC SCM. 152-159 - Darko Kirovski:
Toward an automated verification of certificates of authenticity. 160-169
Session 7
- David M. Pennock:
A dynamic pari-mutuel market for hedging, wagering, and information aggregation. 170-179 - Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes:
Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation. 180-188 - Sham M. Kakade, Michael J. Kearns, Yishay Mansour, Luis E. Ortiz
:
Competitive algorithms for VWAP and limit order trading. 189-198 - Udi Manber:
Customer-centric innovations for search and e-commerce. 199 - Sarah Spiekermann:
Product context in EC websites: how consumer uncertainty and purchase risk drive navigational needs. 200-207 - Pearl Huan Z. Pu, Pratyush Kumar:
Evaluating example-based search tools. 208-217 - Qing Wang, Dwight J. Makaroff, H. Keith Edwards:
Characterizing customer groups for an e-commerce website. 218-227
Brief announcements
- Alan H. Karp, Ren Wu, Kay-Yut Chen, Alex Zhang:
A game tree strategy for automated negotiation. 228-229 - Moshe Tennenholtz:
Transitive voting. 230-231 - Ana Cristina Bicharra Garcia
, Martin A. Ekstrom, Hans C. Bjornsson:
HYRIWYG: leveraging personalization to elicit honest recommendations. 232-233 - Kay-Yut Chen, Tad Hogg, Nathan Wozny:
Experimental study of market reputation mechanisms. 234-235 - Tad Hogg, Lada A. Adamic:
Enhancing reputation mechanisms via online social networks. 236-237 - Meir Bing, Daniel Lehmann, Paul Milgrom:
Presentation and structure of substitutes valuations. 238-239 - Marc A. Smith, Duncan Davenport, Howard Hwa, Tammara Combs Turner:
Object auras: a mobile retail and product annotation system. 240-241 - Stefano Leonardi, Guido Schäfer:
Cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods for connected facility location games. 242-243 - Shuchi Chawla, Uday Rajan, R. Ravi, Amitabh Sinha:
Worst-case payoffs of a location game. 244-245 - Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Behavorial mechanism design as an online marketing tool. 246-247 - Yacov Yacobi:
On the economics of anti-counterfeiting. 248-249 - Debasis Mishra:
Simple primal-dual auctions are not possible. 250-251 - Artur Czumaj, Amir Ronen:
On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation: [extended abstract]. 252-253 - Chuck Lam:
SNACK: incorporating social network information in automated collaborative filtering. 254-255 - Sheng Zhang, Song Ye, Fillia Makedon, James Ford:
A hybrid negotiation strategy mechanism in an automated negotiation system. 256-257 - Ryan Porter, Yoav Shoham:
Designing efficient online trading systems. 258-259 - Michael P. O'Mahony, Neil J. Hurley, Guenole C. M. Silvestre:
Utility-based neighbourhood formation for efficient and robust collaborative filtering. 260-261 - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. 262-263 - Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result. 264-265 - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments. 266-267 - Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm:
Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctions. 268-269
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